CHINA'S SPACE CAPABILITIES AND THEIR REGIONAL SECURITY IMPLICATIONS
China's space ambition began as early as 1958 after the Soviet Union successfully launched the Sputnik I satellite.
1 However, its first satellite was not launched until April 1970, with barely any meaningful function. During that period, with the determination to catch up with Western powers and an expanding pool of rocket and space scientists, China did gradually build up its capability, knowledge, technology and organizations to develop ballistic missiles and space rockets. 2 Therefore, by the 1980s, China was capable of launching satellites and engaging a variety of space tests. It even went further to join the international commercial satellite market and launched more than 30 satellites for European and Asian countries. 3 Since the mid-1990s, rapid economic growth along with easier access to former Soviet space technologies has helped its space programs to reach a new level.
Today, besides realizing its dream to send Taikonauts 4 to the orbit, China has begun to organize a robust satellite network with 22 different types of satellites by providing comprehensive intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, communication, remote sensing, meteorological monitoring, global positioning and target acquisition capabilities. 5 It is expected that China's space capability development will greatly improve its comprehensive national power. More importantly, this capability may eventually have the potential to change international and regional security landscape. 6 This research drew a variety of sources from China's space program white papers and analyses done by American, European, Indian, Chinese and Taiwanese regional security experts to explore potential security and strategic implications of rapid Chinese space capability development. For practical purposes, the research will study 2 Chinese space policy, doctrine and initiatives and its past history and current progresses to look into their political, economic, military and psychological impacts to the regional countries and global community. In doing so, the study hopes to provide constructive recommendations for strategic decision-makers to consider when they approach China's rising space capability.
From a political standpoint, the successes in the manned space program and other space capabilities have no doubt significantly boosted China's national confidence and self-esteem. After possessing more and more critical technologies, China will be less susceptible to sensitive technology export controls imposed by the U.S. and other Western powers. More importantly, with increased space capability and sophistication, China is better positioned as an active player in space and the strategic arms control arena. In the future, the exclusive strategic arms talks between the U.S. and Russia must include China to make sure of its cooperation. Overall, China will be more influential in the global political and strategic arena. With that in mind, the international community is increasingly concerned of China's ambition and intention in space development. For example, its satellite jamming and anti-satellite missile tests in 2002
and 2007 triggered an outcry from the U.S. and other major European and Asian powers about China's intention toward the space arms race. 7 Furthermore, China's notorious record as one of the world's leading weapon proliferators made the U.S.
congress and other international non-proliferation organizations extremely cautious about its export of dual-purpose space technology to Iran and other countries. 8 Economically, China's expanding space capability has not much impact to its overall gross domestic product (GDP). However, the space programs, especially manned space flight programs, will help China develop a large number of young engineers and scientists and accelerate its technological spinoffs and innovations. 9 This will greatly improve China's competitiveness in future high-tech industries. China's international cooperation programs, particularly those with Brazil and European countries, provide it renewed opportunities to absorb new technologies, and greatly enhance China's geographical and geological information system and its ability to formulate a better designed territorial management plan to more effectively use its agricultural, forestry, mineral resources and deal with natural disasters such as long drought in Northern and Southwestern China. More importantly, its new generation oceanographic and meteorological remote sensing satellites will greatly help its ability to understand long term climate pattern changes in its surrounding sea areas and develop better weather forecasting system to prepare possible natural disasters and early disaster management plans.
Militarily, this comprehensive space program will be a critical force multiplier and key component to its military modernization. With a robust intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR), electric warfare (EW), communication and global positioning satellite network, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) will be better equipped to enhance its strategic early warning, joint command and control, long-range precision targeting, expeditionary operation support and long range strike capabilities. 10 In particular, China's future aircraft carrier battle groups, blue water fleets and strategic air force will benefit greatly with this newly established satellite network. In fact, they will not be fully operational in modern naval terms without robust satellite and space asset network support. In the future, with a robust space capability, the PLA will be more capable of executing anti-access and area denial operations ( for example, providing early warning, target acquisition and terminal guidance for its DF-21D anti-ship ballistic missiles and other long range cruise missiles) and rapid responses to most contingencies in its surrounding regions. Further, its anti-satellite capability, as yet unable to reduce U.S.
space capability, will still help it to temporarily deny certain American space assets, delay U.S. and international intervention and give China necessary time to neutralize its targets, especially in the event of conflict in the Taiwan Strait.
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In the psychological and information perspectives, the successes in manned space flight programs and improved satellite capabilities would deliver a very powerful strategic communication message to both the Chinese population and global audiences.
They justified the causes of Chinese leadership, by providing more innovations, economic spinoffs and higher national prestige, to engage in such an expensive endeavor and further its ruling legitimacy by firming the loyalty contract between the Chinese Communist Party and its governed population. 12 For other global audiences, these achievements manifested Chinese technological advances and reaffirmed its great power status as the third country capable of pushing manned space programs. 23 In spite of export controls by the U.S., China still managed to produce a variety of satellites and gradually improved its sophistication and quality.
Currently, China's military still controls and operates these programs. 24 Therefore, the PLA has significant influence over satellite and other space technology development.
China has had a very ambitious plan to develop its manned space flight programs and satellite network. So far, its space flight programs outpace satellite programs. Many experts believed that Chinese leadership wants to garner domestic support, build national prestige, stimulate technological innovation and improve its international stance 8 with this highly publicized undertaking. 25 This imbalanced development probably manifests its cautious approach to space programs. The export limitation by the U.S.
and other Western powers does constrain China to make a breakthrough in certain critical technologies. Before controlling those key technologies, China is still willing to approach its satellite programs in a "touching the stone while crossing river" 26 manner.
Moreover, China has good reasons to be patient. Its strong economy and huge market offer attractive opportunities for foreign investors and high probability for buying 30 These all show that it has gradually built up a powerful space support capability. 31 Over time, even with continuous U.S. technology transfer restrictions and export control measures, China is still expected to accumulate enough experiences and know-how to accelerate its space programs and improve its overall satellite quality. In the following content, the study will explore the political, economic, military and psychological/information implications of China's space programs.
Political and Economic Implications
Chinese leaders regard current space capability development, especially the manned space flight program, as important as the development of nuclear weapons in the 1950s. 32 When it sent the first Taikonaut into space in 2003, China has become the third country capable of effective manned space flight, after Russia and the U.S.
Chinese leadership regarded it as an achievement to restore China's long lost historical prestige. 33 According to its 2006 space white paper, China intends to send a manned Besides improving national confidence and garnering political support, China's space development also encourages many young and talented students to join this enterprise, especially the basic sciences related to space development. The expected rich supply of space-related engineers and scientists will help China to build a foundation for its future innovation and competitiveness in the long run. In turn, this momentum will boost its future economic development and improve the averaged living standard of the common population, which is the most important pillar of communist rule. Therefore, China's space program serves as a very important launch pad for its further technological development and support for Communist Party rule.
Obviously, with its stronger space capability and accumulated successes, China will gradually gain more bargaining power and a higher regional and international stance over space affairs. In the future, important issues like strategic arms and space weapon limitation negotiations will no longer be dominated by the U.S. and Russia. The international community has to take China into account. Moreover, China has been aggressively promoting space cooperation with other regional countries and important However, for China's neighbors, the U.S. and Western world, the most important concern is China's real intention and plan in space development. China's inconsistency between its stated policy and behavior, secrecy, and less-than-cooperative attitude in space programs, all have obvious negative psychological effects to other countries. In particular, its 2007 anti-satellite missile test led to serious concerns and suspicions from the U.S. and many regional players. This is definitely not a positive development for China. 54 From Chinese public sources, it is obvious that many Chinese political and military leaders believe in the inevitability of space militarization, particularly U.S.
deployment of space weapons. 55 This serious misunderstanding of U.S. space policy leads to a mentality that probably will jeopardize future possible space cooperation between China and other major space players.
Issues in questions
The impact of Chinese space developments on the regional security landscape and U.S. national security interest will gradually emerge. China's space programs are still far from helping it to improve its comprehensive national power and international political bargains. Nonetheless, its great successes in manned space programs did help its national prestige and image as a technologically advanced country in the AsianPacific region. 56 Whether its space programs will help its international political influence, to a large extent, still depends on other programs besides manned space programs. If
China could make obvious breakthroughs in its military satellite programs, its overall operational capabilities will improve greatly. In turn, its leverage over border disputes and regional security issues, such as South and East China Sea maritime security, will become much stronger. However, no matter how aggressive China pushes in its space programs, it is nearly impossible to challenge U.S. space dominance in the foreseeable future. 57 What the U.S. government has to pay attention to is China's quick development of a large pool of basic and space related scientific talents, who will be able to accelerate China's innovative and technological capability. Compared with the retiring and aging space scientist group in the U.S., China's space scientists and engineers are on average only 40 years old. Its universities and graduate schools produce 12 times more technology and science-majored students than the U.S. 58 Its current slow progress in certain fields, to a large extent, is due to the talent disruption in the Culture Revolution in the 1960s to 1970s when numerous scientists and engineers were thrown into labor camps. Thanks to its economic boom and space success, China is making up this huge generation gap. The massive new generation of scientists and engineers will make significant contribution to China's technological innovation, economic development and military modernization in the future. Thus, their impact on regional security and U.S. regional interest will gradually become obvious.
China's space program will pose significant challenges to international community in terms of weapons proliferation and space arms race. China's military still has a significant control over space programs. Due to its testing of an anti-satellite missile, satellite jamming systems and other space weapons, many Western and U.S.
security experts are extremely suspicious of China's intention in space weapon development. 59 However, from its stated policy and low-key manner in those weapons, along with its space technological level being far behind U.S. and Western powers, it is unlikely that China will engage in a space arms race with the U.S. It is more likely that China will develop those weapons as part of its anti-access and area-denial strategyto delay U.S. forces rushing to a Taiwan Strait military crisis. Actually, its focus on economic development will exclude the possibility to engage in an outright space race with the U.S. and jeopardize its continuous introduction of new Western technologies. 60 However, China's space industry is eager to find new business market and make up its limited official budget. Its aggressive pursuit of business opportunities could make China a space technology proliferator. China has already had a notorious record in the past by selling nuclear and ballistic technologies to several dictator regimes. The space program will give China a powerful leverage to regional security issues, especially its traditional territorial disputes and Taiwan issue. Currently, the Asia-Pacific regional countries are cautious about China's space capability developments. 62 Unlike the low possibility for China to challenge U.S. space dominance, it is very likely that the continuous progress in China's space capability will change the security landscape in the region. Proven by its current success in Arabian Sea counterpiracy efforts, new space capability will extend its power projection reach. Judging
China's satellite and other space asset development, it is evident that China is developing an anti-access and area-denial capability. Once it becomes fully operational, China will be able to exclude U.S. intervention for a certain period of time. 63 Indeed, with a few targeted attacks against key U.S. space assets, China can delay U.S. military intervention by several days or longer-which is enough for China to launch military actions against Taiwan. This is an especially serious concern for Taiwan's defense planners. For Taiwan to face an all-out Chinese invasion, it must count on the U.S.
aircraft carrier battle groups for its salvation-but salvation time is limited, probably by weeks only, if not by days. It appears that Taiwan has two options: either to build up a very strong military force as deterrent or to bog down on China's reunification demand.
Both will impact the overall security landscape in the region and compromise U.S.
regional interests.
Furthermore, in some disputed areas in the East and South China Seas and the Sino-Indian border, with its improved C3 and ISR satellite capability, and newly developed airborne warning and air control systems (AWACS) and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV), China can effectively monitor adversaries' military movement and outmaneuver them at sea and on land. This is already obvious in the South China Sea.
Chinese naval capability has outnumbered and outgunned over all regional claimants in this area. 64 Once combined with integrated space support, these countries' naval fleets will be simply sitting ducks at best. This is a serious threat even to India. China has procured new generation anti-ballistic missiles such as S-300s and S-400 air defense missiles, which are capable of shooting down less sophisticated Indian ballistic missiles, thus reducing their deterrent value. Therefore, China does not need to develop a space capability as powerful as that of the U.S. and is still able to change the regional security landscape. So far, this is the most likely security goal that China wishes to achieve. 65 The intention, scale, prospects, and constraints of China's space program will dictate international responses. China's space development, in terms of technologies, human capital and investments, will be limited in scope. Even its manned space program, with only 2 billion yuan (about $300 million) annual budget, is less likely to reach former Soviet scale, let alone compete with the U.S. 66 China is likely to continue its focused programs in communication, remote sensing, global positioning/timing, ISR, 22 space imagery, electronic intelligence and meteorological satellites, along with manned/unmanned space flight programs and certain secret counter space weapons.
These systems will better serve China's near to medium term requirements. 67 Although having a series of manned/unmanned space flight successes in the last decade, China's plan to build space station and send a remote controlled robots to the Moon has not realized as scheduled. 68 As proven by its space undertakings and its attitude in space development, China is not likely to run an outright space race (not even space arms race) with the U.S.
Therefore, it is possible for the U.S. to work peacefully in space with China. To the minimum extent, both countries can communicate their intentions and reduce the misunderstanding over space militarization issues. Therefore, this study offers several recommendations for future policy consideration.
Recommendations
Increasing official meetings and academic exchanges could be the first step to It is necessary for both parties to discuss possibilities of establishing space demilitarization convention-where China is eager to push-and space security talks so as to increase mutual trust.
It is mutually beneficial to establish space emergency management cooperative channels. With China becoming the third country with manned space flight programs and U.S. concerns over space technology transfer, space emergency management is a possible channel to establish cooperation. The accumulation of a large amount of space debris has become a serious threat to satellites and manned space vehicles.
Sharing space monitoring information can help both sides to prevent disasters from happening. Even more importantly, when an accident occurs, China will require U.S
and Russian help to rescue its Taikonauts from peril. This is another less controversial area that China is likely to work with other countries. In working with these areas, the U.S. can initiate space rescue exercises with China and deepen its understanding of Chinese space programs. Again, these activities will help both sides to build mutual trust and clarify misunderstanding. The U.S. has to assure regional allies and partners with strong security commitments. Besides seeking cooperative opportunities with China, reassuring regional countries is even a more important policy for the U.S. to pursue. The sense of China's threat is likely to prompt regional powers to engage in costly military build-ups.
In turn, it will cause dangerous open-ended arms races. Especially for those powerful countries with long disputing territorial disputes and technological capability of their own, such as India and Japan, they would have every reason to develop countermeasures to off-set China's space superiority. Therefore, reassuring those countries that the U.S.
will honor its commitments and provide timely support to them is very important. At the same time, the U.S. should communicate a clear message to China that it will support those regional countries facing aggression and coercion. By doing so, it will make those countries planning to develop weapons to counter Chinese threats have second thoughts, and hopefully reduce the possibility of an arms race in the region.
Preventing possible space technology proliferations should be taken into account.
Currently, China's aggressive attitude in seeking space market to help its space industries leads to concerns that its space technologies may end up in certain undesired 26 parties, especially those outlaw regimes, terrorist organizations and criminal cartels.
Due to their dual-purpose characteristics, space technologies like encrypted satellite communication and small satellites are difficult to control. Especially when they are not U.S. patented technologies, it is almost impossible to forcefully demand China not to export them. Therefore, close monitoring the end users of those technologies is critical to prevent them from falling into undesired parties' hands. This will be a very difficult challenge requiring international intelligence, commerce, law-enforcement and diplomatic cooperation. The U.S. even needs to dissuade China from selling those sensitive technologies to certain countries without a robust control and monitor system to space assets. Hopefully this will work. However, if the U.S. and Western powers continue to block China's space business opportunities, it is likely that China will continue to seek work-arounds. Therefore, the U.S. government needs to consider how to revise its 2002 satellite export control to China to reduce its incentive to go extreme.
The U.S. should explore possibilities in outer space cooperation with China.
Many security experts are concerned that cooperating with China in space development will help it develop more powerful tools to jeopardize Asia-Pacific regional security.
However, China has the capacity to develop those capabilities on its own. It is only a matter of time before China acquires such threatening technologies. A country long suspicious of the Western block, when it finally builds up those abilities, will make it more difficult to negotiate. Therefore, finding cooperative possibilities to create a positive political atmosphere is more constructive to global security than merely technological blocking. China has worked with the European Aerospace Agency in remote robot programs to explore the Moon and Mars. This shows evidence that there 27 are still possibilities to cooperate with China and lead it to a more constructive way.
Deep space exploration is a field that could help China to develop its own space technologies and merge it into international cooperation. In turn, there is hope to change China's zero-sum game mentality toward security issues.
Conclusion
China's space capability development will improve its comprehensive national power. In particular, the massive new generation of scientists and engineers, motivated by its successes in manned space flight programs, will create a paradigm change in China's innovation and technological development. But judging by its resources and investments in space programs, China is unlikely to engage in an outright space arms race with the U.S. Therefore, China does not pose an immediate threat to U.S. space dominance. Nonetheless, its increasingly capable space programs will change the Asia-Pacific regional security landscape. Without effective precautions and solid reassurance to regional countries, it is possible to cause a strategic arms race in the region. The U.S. cannot exclude this possibility and should take necessary measures to prevent it from happening.
It appears that the Chinese political and military leadership misunderstand U.S.
space dominance and space militarization issues. The U.S. has to proactively approach Chinese leadership and clarify this misunderstanding and reduce mistrust. Under the current situation, increasing all possible contacts between both sides' policy-makers, military leaders, security experts and space practitioners, is possible and should be undertaken in order to build mutual understanding and trust. In the long run, this will help the new generation of Chinese leaders work their space programs toward a more positive path to regional stability and prosperity. Thus, the U.S. and international community should have a more forward looking view in changing deep-rooted Chinese mindset.
In sum, Chinese space capability development has the potential to improve its comprehensive national power, national prestige and international standing; but it could also negatively change the regional security landscape. As China's society, economy and politics are changing, there are opportunities to change its mentality toward the West and create a cooperative rising great power. All depend on how the U.S. and international community work together to promote a positive atmosphere of trust and mutual interests. 
